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RELIGION AND LATINO PARTISANSHIP  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the interplay between religion, ethnicity, and the partisanship 
of Latinos in the United States. Using pooled data from the 1990-2000 National Election Studies, 
we assess denominational affiliation and religious commitment as explanations of partisanship. 
We show that there is more religious diversity among Latinos than is usually acknowledged in 
studies of Latino politics and that the political importance of religion among Latinos has not 
been adequately assessed because variation beyond a Catholic/non-Catholic dichotomy has been 
ignored. We demonstrate that variation in Latino religious affiliation has important political 
implications. 
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Contemporary American politics is as competitive as any time in history. As evidenced 
by recent elections, even small changes in partisan sympathies or political activity can have a 
profound impact on the balance of partisan power and accompanying policy outcomes. Given 
this tenuousness, it is instructive for students of politics to explore sources of partisan change in 
the U.S. electorate. The rising tide of Latinos seems poised to create such change.1  
The Latino population of the United States has grown dramatically in the past few 
decades, surpassing blacks as the largest minority group in the 2002 Current Population Survey. 
Electorally, Latinos comprised a larger proportion of voters in 2000 than in any previous 
election. Existing studies have focused on the low levels of participation and citizenship among 
Latinos, but the political importance of Latinos is increasing (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Calvo and 
Rosenstone 1989; Diaz 1996; J. Garcia 1997; Hero and Campbell 1996; Hritzuk and Park 2000; 
Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Verba et al. 1993). Since 1994, in fact, Latino participation in 
elections has increased at almost the same rate as their growth in the population. Given the sheer 
number of Latinos as well as evidence of rising naturalization and political participation levels, 
more attention to Latino political behavior is appropriate in order to appreciate the nature and 
magnitude of their current and future influence on U.S. politics. 
While several studies have explored the partisanship and issue attitudes of Latinos 
(Alvarez and Bedollo 2003; Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Coffin 
2003; F. Garcia 1997; Kosmin and Keysar 1995; Welch and Sigelman 1993), this paper focuses 
specifically on religion and partisanship. Our analysis seeks to understand the interplay between 
religion and ethnicity in politics and to assess the determinants of partisanship in an important 
minority. The paper is organized in three sections. First we establish the theoretical 
underpinnings of our work by discussing how religion can influence Latino politics in the United 
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States. Second, we describe the religious composition of Latinos in the United States during the 
1990s. Third, we analyze the connection between Latino religion and partisanship. We conclude 
by discussing the implications of these findings for partisan alignments in the United States. 
Explaining Latino Partisanship 
Recently, scholars have conducted creative analyses to provide new analytical leverage 
on the formation of partisanship among Latinos (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Coffin 2003). But 
these studies do not diverge from earlier studies in at least one important respect – they give little 
attention to the influence of religion in Latino politics. Studies that do examine religion usually 
conceptualize it simply as a dichotomy between Catholic and not Catholic. Perhaps due in part to 
this simplified conceptualization, the literature on the political behavior of Latinos arrives at 
mixed conclusions as to the effect of religion. In a study comparing the participation of Anglos, 
African-Americans and Latinos, Verba and his colleagues (1993) find that both religious 
affiliation and church attendance are important explanatory factors in understanding participation 
levels, particularly the low participation of Latinos. Kosmin and Keysar (1995) also find support 
for the notion that religion is politically important among Latinos, suggesting that Protestants are 
more likely than Catholics to be Republican. On the other hand, Welch and Sigelman (1993) find 
few differences between Latinos of different religious backgrounds, and de la Garza, Falcon, and 
Garcia (1996) find no religious influence on the core values held by Mexican-Americans. 
Overall, we know little about the political implications of Latino religion. 
The primary reason for this lack of knowledge is likely data limitations. Only a few data 
collections that focus on Latinos are available, most prominent among these being the Latino 
National Political Survey and a more recent study funded by the Pew and Kaiser foundations. 
These Latino data sources, however, make use of an outdated measure of religious affiliation that 
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limits their usefulness for studying the connection between religion and politics.2 No publicly 
available single data source that provides useful measures of both religion and politics includes 
enough Latino respondents to conduct convincing analysis. We overcome this problem by using 
National Election Studies (NES) data from 1990-2000. By pooling these years, we are able to 
examine nearly 1000 Latino respondents.3 With regard to religion, the NES has included a fairly 
comprehensive battery of religious measures since 1990. Thus, we make use of a source 
specifically designed to study neither Latinos nor religion, but one that provides more detailed 
information about both than any other publicly available source. 
Mechanisms of Religious Impact 
We base our analysis primarily on the theory that churches provide an important social 
context in which political information is exchanged (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Different 
churches communicate different political ideas, and people affiliated with various kinds of 
churches are likely to adopt partisan attachments that are consistent with the messages received 
(from both religious elites and fellow parishioners). The type of church one attends is central to 
the contextual theory of religious influence, and is likely particularly important among those in 
the process of learning about politics in a new country. However, religion is a multidimensional 
concept, and in the past two decades the religion and politics literature has begun to account for 
this multidimensionality more carefully by placing emphasis on two psychological facets of 
religion – theological beliefs and religious behaviors (Guth et al. 1995; Jelen 1991; Kellstedt et 
al. 1996; Layman 1997; Layman and Carmines 1997). While theories emphasizing psychological 
factors differ in important ways from the contextual conception of religious influence, we bring 
these two approaches together in our analysis. 
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More specifically, we hypothesize that certain religious behaviors and beliefs will 
condition the effect of political information that flows to individuals in churches. At the very 
minimum, people must attend religious services to be exposed to the political messages that are 
presented. Other forms of religious behavior such as prayer and bible reading might also make 
individuals more likely to adopt political views communicated in a religious context. In addition, 
those who evidence a willingness to accept religious doctrine on faith should be more likely to 
accept and be influenced by political messages disseminated in churches. In sum, we hypothesize 
that high (or low) levels of religious orthodoxy and activity will magnify (or diminish) the effect 
of political messages delivered in the context of a church. 
To operationalize the concepts discussed above we ideally would observe the political 
messages exchanged in churches. Individual-level analysis could then be conducted to determine 
whether the partisanship of Latinos in varying church contexts responds predictably to 
differences in political messages and to assess whether this response is conditioned by individual 
variation in religious behaviors and beliefs. While the NES does not provide detailed data about 
the political messages Latinos receive in churches, it does provide specific information about 
denominational affiliation (Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt 1990). Based on this information, we 
categorize Latinos according to the religious tradition (or denominational family) of which they 
are a part (Kellstedt et al. 1996). Using religious tradition as a proxy for church context makes 
the imperfect assumption that meaningful variation in political messages exists across, but not 
within, religious traditions. This is an obvious source of measurement error that, if serious 
enough, will attenuate the relationship between religious affiliation and partisanship. Finally, we 
operationalize the concepts of religious belief and behavior by combining them in a measure of 
 7
religious commitment that includes attendance of religious services, prayer, bible reading, the 
importance of religion, biblical inerrancy, and affiliation with a church. 
Latino Religious Affiliation in the United States 
Some might be inclined to dismiss the above discussion based on the assumption that 
there is little if any religious variation in the Latino population. After all, it is a common belief 
that the overwhelming majority of Latinos are Catholic. Without religious variation there would 
be little effect of religion on partisanship or other political attitudes and behavior. If this view 
were correct it would matter little how previous studies of Latino politics have accounted for 
religion. A dichotomous measure would be more than adequate. 
However, the stereotype that the Latino population is overwhelmingly and immutably 
Catholic is inaccurate and misleading. While scholars of American religion have become aware 
of declining attachment to Catholicism among Latinos (Greeley 1994), political scientists have 
paid little attention to this phenomenon. Previous studies suggest that approximately three-
quarters of Latinos were affiliated with the Catholic Church during the 1980s, declining from 
over 80% in earlier decades (Greeley 1994; Hunt 1998). Table 1A indicates a further decline in 
Latino affiliation with the Catholic Church, with 44 percent of Latinos identifying as non-
Catholics during the 1990s. While non-Catholic Latinos are mostly evangelical Protestants, our 
data indicate that an appreciable percentage are either mainline Protestant or have no religious 
affiliation. Clearly, religion is not a constant factor among Latinos. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The remaining gap between Latinos and the rest of the population raises the possibility of 
further shifts away from Catholicism. One specific piece of evidence suggests that additional 
religious change among Latinos is not just possible, but probable. Table 1B gives an indirect 
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indication that much of the shift away from Catholicism occurs after immigration to the United 
States.4 Those born and raised outside the U.S. are much more Catholic than those born and 
raised in the United States. This indicates that as Latinos spend more time in the United States 
they become even more likely to leave their traditional Catholic roots and embrace other 
religious traditions. But are there political implications for these apparent religious changes? 
Religion and Partisanship in the Latino Population 
We begin to answer this question by examining the relationship between denominational 
affiliation and partisan identification. When we examine all of the Latinos in our sample (Table 
2A), we see that Roman Catholics are the most strongly Democratic, with 65 percent reporting 
attachment to the Democratic Party. The other religious traditions support Democrats less, but to 
varying degrees. Over half of evangelical Protestants and of those not affiliated with a church 
express support for the Democratic Party, but fewer than 40 percent of mainline Protestants 
identify as Democrats. This appears to indicate that the influence of religious tradition among 
Latinos is different than in the non-Latino population. Evangelicals identify most strongly with 
the Republican Party among non-Latinos, and the unaffiliated tend to be Democrats. But here we 
see that evangelicals and the unaffiliated are fairly similar, with mainline Protestants being the 
most distinctive in their partisan attachments. However, evangelicals are much lower in social 
economic status than the other traditions, so the partisan differences between evangelicals and 
other groups may be understated in this bivariate relationship. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Given that Latinos come from different cultural (and political) backgrounds depending on 
their country of origin, we examine the association between religious tradition and partisan 
identification for ethnic subgroups in the next four parts of the table. While the sample sizes for 
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these subgroups are quite small, we can get some sense of whether the general relationship 
between denominational family and partisanship is similar among Latinos from different 
countries of origin. The results presented in parts B, C, D, and E of Table 2 are somewhat 
surprising. The relationship between religion and partisanship is similar among Mexicans, 
Cubans, and other Latinos; but is reversed among Puerto Ricans. Smaller variations also exist 
among the other three ethnic categories, with the partisan differences across religious tradition 
largest among “other Latinos” and smallest among Latinos originating from Mexico. 
We are also curious whether the time that an individual has spent in the United States 
influences the association between denominational affiliation and partisanship. The last three 
parts of Table 2 show substantial differences in partisan affiliation across religious traditions 
among Latinos who are presumably the most recent immigrants (those born and raised abroad). 
Partisan variation across religious tradition is also substantial among those who were born and 
raised in the United States. However, the relationship is minimal in the middle category which is 
comprised of Latinos who spent some time in the U.S. and some time abroad as a child. Given 
the bivariate nature of these subgroup analyses, we do not go into a more detailed discussion of 
the results presented so far. However, these results should be kept in mind as they motivate a 
portion of the more rigorous multivariate analysis in the next section. 
Multivariate Analysis of Religion and Partisanship 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the familiar NES measure of partisanship that 
assesses both the strength and direction of partisan affiliation. This seven-point scale ranges from 
strong Democrat (coded 1) to strong Republican (coded 7), and we utilize standard OLS 
regression to produce the reported results.5 In addition to religion, controls are included for 
respondents’ place of birth and childhood, country of origin, sex, age, income, education, 
ideology, and egalitarianism. Controlling for these factors is important, but it leads to a loss of 
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cases due to missing data. Given the small sample and the accompanying importance of each and 
every case, we use the AMELIA multiple imputation procedure developed by King, et al. (2000) 
to deal with this issue.6 
We present the results of two models of Latino partisanship in Table 3. The first column 
analyzes religion in a manner that is consistent with many previous studies of Latino politics. In 
this model, we examine the influence of affiliation with a non-Catholic church (or no church at 
all) compared to affiliation with the Catholic Church. Even using this rudimentary and 
oversimplified conceptualization of Latino denominational affiliation, we see that religion 
influences Latino partisanship. Specifically, non-Catholics are much more likely to be 
Republicans than those affiliated with Catholicism. However, this simple conceptualization of 
religious affiliation masks some interesting nuances. 
The first model has at least two shortcomings. First, it does not account for religious 
variation beyond a Catholic/non-Catholic dichotomy. Second, it takes no account of religious 
behavior or beliefs. We correct both of these problems in a second model that uses the more 
detailed measure of denominational affiliation used throughout the bivariate analyses above. We 
also add a measure of religious commitment that provides information about each respondent’s 
level of religious activity and doctrinal orthodoxy. While the effect of religious commitment on 
its own may provide important information, we are theoretically more concerned with how 
religious commitment conditions the influence of denominational affiliation on Latino 
partisanship. Thus, we utilize interaction terms between religious commitment and 
denominational family to account for the possibility that higher (lower) levels of religious 
commitment augment (diminish) the effect of religious affiliation. Also, in order to incorporate 
the insights gleaned from the earlier bivariate analysis, we add interaction terms between the 
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religious variables and country of origin and time spent in the U.S. These interaction terms allow 
a multivariate assessment of how the effect of religion varies across population subgroups. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The second column of Table 3 reports the results of this model. The first conclusion is 
that a dichotomous view of Latino religion is inappropriate, and a comprehensive understanding 
of the political implications of religion cannot be obtained without the more sophisticated 
measurement of religious affiliation utilized in this analysis. The effect of affiliation with a non-
Catholic tradition varies depending on the specific non-Catholic affiliation. Evangelicals and, 
especially, mainline Protestants are much less Democratic in their partisan identification. In fact, 
affiliation with a mainline Protestant church as opposed to the Catholic Church produces, on 
average, a shift of almost a full point on the partisanship scale (with religious commitment at its 
mean level). Respondents with no religious affiliation, however, are not significantly different 
from Catholics and may be more Democratic. So movement away from Catholicism has different 
political implications depending on the exact nature of the change. Secondly, while we see that 
most of the interactions between religious tradition and religious commitment are in the expected 
direction, their lack of significance prevents a conclusion that religious commitment conditions 
the effect of religious tradition in the hypothesized manner. One explanation for this could be 
that the religious behavior and belief measures do not effectively capture the type of connection 
to the church that would condition the flow of information to the congregant. A second 
possibility is that the hypotheses regarding the conditional effects of religious context are correct 
but cannot be confirmed with the sample size available. 
The final model in Table 3 also tests variation in the effect of religion across subgroups 
of the Latino population. Our use of interaction terms is analogous to conducting subgroup 
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regression analysis (Friedrich 1982). While using interaction terms to compute subgroup effects 
prevents the need to run separate regression models within each subgroup of interest, the 
difficulty of obtaining statistical significance in small subgroups remains. Probably in large part 
because of this, the only statistically discernable difference in the effect of religion across Latino 
subgroups is that the effect of evangelicalism among other Latinos is larger than for Mexicans 
(the reference group). Similarly, the effect of religion generally does not vary between Latinos 
born in the U.S. versus those born abroad, with the exception that the influence of mainline 
Protestantism is augmented for those born in the U.S. 
The Electoral Importance of Religion and Politics 
The analysis to this point suggests that recent changes in the religious composition of the 
Latino population have likely had consequences for the partisanship of the Latino population. 
Partisanship, though extremely important, does not directly determine election outcomes and the 
policies these outcomes produce. Partisan change in conjunction with electoral participation is 
what really matters. Specifically, the political importance of the religious changes that have 
occurred in the Latino population could be reduced if these same religious changes retard 
electoral participation. For example, the electoral benefits to Republicans of shifts toward 
evangelicalism would be minimized if evangelicals fail to participate in elections. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to address this possibility, we present a simple bivariate analysis of religious 
tradition and electoral participation in Table 4. We see that evangelical Latinos are registered to 
vote and report voting in elections at nearly the same rate as Catholics. In addition, mainline 
Protestants are substantially more likely than Catholics to participate in elections. Together, these 
results support the conclusion that documented shifts from Catholicism to either mainline or 
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evangelical Protestantism have current electoral importance, with such shifts benefiting the 
Republican Party. Those not affiliated with a church or denomination are the least likely to 
participate in elections. Recalling that the non-affiliated are likely a bit more Democratic than 
Catholics, this means that the one religious shift that could help the Democratic Party is also the 
most strongly moderated by a lack of participation. 
Latinos, Religion, and Partisanship in the United States 
In this paper we have shown that religious changes previously documented among 
Latinos have continued through the 1990s. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Latinos are diverse 
religiously. More Latinos than ever are not Catholic and the non-Catholic category exhibits 
considerable religious and political variation. The data show that an appreciable percentage of 
Latinos are evangelical or mainline Protestants, or have no religious affiliation. More important, 
these religious differences matter politically. Latinos affiliated with denominations of various 
religious traditions diverge in their partisan affiliations. These variations are not only present in 
bivariate analyses, but also persist as significant predictors when controlling for a variety of 
other characteristics. More specifically, we have found that affiliation with evangelical and, 
especially, mainline Protestant denominations increases identification with the Republican Party. 
On the other hand, those who affiliate with no church or denomination are likely stronger 
Democrats than even Roman Catholics when demographic and political controls are applied. 
While we do not have time-series data with which we can explicitly test dynamic 
hypotheses, our results also provide some leverage on the prospects for future partisan 
alignments among Latinos. In sum, we see two important patterns among Latinos that are central 
to the future of American politics. The first relates to the size of the Latino population – it has 
been growing and will continue to do so for many years to come. Furthermore, the geographical 
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distribution of Latinos serves to emphasize their political importance. While Latinos are not as 
geographically concentrated as they once were, the largest Latino populations exist in some of 
the most electorally important states such as Texas, Florida, California, New York, and Illinois. 
Traditionally, the increasing proportion of Latinos, a disadvantaged immigrant group, has been 
seen as a foundation for Democratic Party success. While Latinos have been disengaged from 
politics in the past, the current partisan alignment among this ethnic group certainly favors 
Democrats as the Latino population grows and becomes more politically active. There is a 
second pattern, however, that might serve to moderate this Democratic advantage. Namely, there 
has been and will likely continue to be a decline in Catholicism among Latinos in the United 
States. This religious change could serve to diminish Latino identification with the Democratic 
Party if increasing numbers of Latinos move to evangelical and mainline Protestant churches. 
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NOTES
 
1 The term Latino will be used in this paper to refer to people who are immigrants or the 
descendants of immigrants from Spain or the former Spanish colonies in Central and South 
America and the Caribbean, as well as people who are descendants of residents of the parts of 
former Spanish colonies that are now part of the United States. The term is used out of 
convenience, and its use is not meant to imply that a common “Latino” identity exists. 
2 These Latino-specific surveys measure religious identification using questions that produce 
invalid and unreliable results because they do not effectively probe the specific church or 
denominational affiliation of each respondent. For a complete discussion of the weaknesses of 
this type of measure, see Kellstedt et al. (1996) and Leege, Wald, and Kellstedt (1990). 
3 Since some of these surveys were panel studies, only those respondents selected as part of the 
cross-sectional study for each survey are examined. The main difference between the NES data 
and sources specifically designed to study Latinos is that the NES interviews respondents only in 
English (except in 1992) while other surveys also offer interviews in Spanish. Data collection 
funded by the Pew and Kaiser foundation in 2002, for example, shows some predictable 
demographic differences as compared to the data we use. The NES sample is marginally more 
educated, female, and wealthy. The two datasets are almost identical, however, in terms of age. 
Thus, throughout the analysis the results are, strictly speaking, only generalized to the English-
speaking portion of the Latino population even though this caveat is not repeatedly offered in the 
paper. Even so, these Latinos are particularly important for politics because they are more 
politically active, and we have no reason to believe that the relationships between religion and 
politics will differ among Spanish speakers compared to those who speak at least some English. 
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4 A more direct measure would be the time spent in the United States or immigration status, but 
these measures are not available. Thus, as a proxy we combine the respondent’s birthplace with 
where the respondent spent most of their time as a child. 
5 A dependent variable with seven ordered categories can usually be analyzed with OLS 
regression. However, we also entertained models which analyzed party identification in three 
categories (Democrat, Independent, and Republican). We applied both ordered and multinomial 
logit estimation procedures and found no substantive differences in the results. Since the 
interpretation of OLS is more straightforward, we report only these results. 
6 Our measures of religion have only a few missing cases. The worst case is ideology, where 
more than a third of the sample failed to provide a useful response. This likely identifies the 
limited utility of the usual conception of ideology in the Latino population. With so many 
missing cases for ideology, limiting the regression analysis to those with valid responses for 
ideology would drastically overstate the importance of ideology and understate the importance of 
variables with fewer missing cases. In order to retain cases in a manner that allows for correct 
parameter estimates, we have utilized Honaker, et al.’s (2000) AMELIA application to perform a 
multiple imputation procedure. This procedure makes use of information from all the variables in 
our analysis plus a few variables not included in the model to create five data sets with missing 
values imputed. The reported parameter estimates are averaged across the five imputed data sets. 
Further details of this type of imputation can be found in King, et al. (2001). 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES 
 
Variable numbers refer to NES Cumulative File. Variables not available in the cumulative file 
were merged with the cumulative file from individual NES studies. Religious Tradition: Based 
on VCF0152. Our categorization of denominations is borrowed largely from Kellstedt et al. 
(1996). The details are available from the authors upon request. Religious Commitment: A 
point is added to the scale for each of the following: attend church at lease once or twice a month 
(VCF0130), pray once a day or more (available in individual NES surveys), read bible at least a 
few times a week (available in individual NES surveys), religion provides at least some guidance 
to one’s life (VCF0847), views Bible as God’s literal word (VCF0850), is affiliated with a 
religious tradition. Range 0 to 6. Mean = 3.54. N = 951. Ethnicity: Based on VCF0109 
(Ethnicity) and VCF0142 (Birthplace). Time in U.S.: Combination of respondent’s place of birth 
(VCF0142) and where the respondent grew up (VCF0132). Three categories: 1) Born and grew 
up outside the United States (Puerto Rico not part of the U.S. for this purpose), 2) Either born or 
brought up in the U.S., 3) Both born and grew up in the U.S. Conservatism: VCF0803. 1 = 
extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative. Mean = 4.24, N = 583. Egalitarianism: Factor 
based combination of the following: VCF9017 (should worry less about equality), VCF9016 (ok 
if some have more equal chance), and VCF9014 (too far in pushing equal rights). Mean = 0, N = 
622. Partisanship: VCF0301. 1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican. Mean = 3.28, N = 
943. Female: VCF0104. 0 = Male, 1 = Female. Mean = .56, N = 951. 
Age: VCF0101. Mean = 40, N = 941. Income: VCF0114. Income quintile. Mean = 2.58, N = 
876. Education: VCF0140. Ranges from less than 8 grades to advanced degrees. Recoded to 
approximate years in school. Mean = 12.8, N = 942. 
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Table 1. Religious Variation Among Latinos 
        
 A. Ethnicity 
Religious Tradition All Latinos Mexicans Cubans Puerto Ricans Other Latinos Non-Latinos 
Evangelical 23% 22% 27% 27% 23% 28% 
Mainline Protestant 7% 7% 3% 4% 7% 19% 
Roman Catholic 56% 59% 63% 58% 53% 26% 
Other 4% 4% 7% 3% 5% 10% 
Secular 9% 8% 0% 9% 12% 17% 
N 951 428 30 109 384  
       
 B. Time in United States 
 
Religious Tradition 
Born and Raised 
Abroad 
Raised Abroad 
and in U.S. 
Born and Raised 
in U.S. 
Evangelical 19% 23% 26% 
Mainline Protestant 4% 7% 8% 
Roman Catholic 61% 55% 54% 
Other 5% 5% 4% 
Secular 11% 10% 8% 
N 241 312 398 
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Table 2. Religion and Latino Partisanship 
       
 Religious Tradition 
Party ID Evangelical Mainline Catholic Other Secular All 
A. All Latinos       
Democrat 56% 37% 65% 50% 56% 60% 
Independent 9% 21% 21% 33% 20% 13% 
Republican 34% 42% 24% 18% 24% 27% 
N 218 62 534 40 89 943 
B. Cubans       
Democrat 25% 0% 37% - 0% 30% 
Republican 75% 100% 53% - 100% 63% 
N 8 1 19 0 2 30 
C. Mexicans       
Democrat 64% 41% 69% 56% 59% 65% 
Republican 26% 45% 20% 13% 21% 21% 
N 94 29 251 16 34 424 
D. Puerto Ricans       
Democrat 83% 75% 61% 67% 70% 69% 
Republican 14% 0% 21% 0% 10% 17% 
N 29 4 62 3 10 108 
E. Others       
Democrat 43% 29% 64% 47% 51% 54% 
Republican 47% 43% 25% 16% 29% 31% 
N 87 28 202 19 45 381 
F. Born and Raised Abroad       
Democrat 46% 70% 62% 36% 64% 58% 
Republican 46% 30% 28% 36% 16% 31% 
N 46 10 148 11 25 240 
G. Raised Abroad and in U.S.       
Democrat 63% 52% 61% 63% 55% 61% 
Republican 31% 29% 27% 13% 29% 28% 
N 70 21 171 16 31 309 
H. Born and Raised in U.S.       
Democrat 57% 16% 70% 46% 52% 60% 
Republican 31% 55% 17% 8% 24% 24% 
N 102 31 215 13 33 394 
       
Note: Cell entries are column percentages. Party identifiers include those that explicitly identify or 
“lean” toward one of the parties. Columns do not add to 100% because “Independent” is a 
residual category that was not included to conserve space in the subgroup analysis. 
 
 24
 
 
Table 3. Religion and Partisanship Among Latinos in the United States 
  
 Partisanship (Republican +) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
Religion   
Non-Catholic  .12** (.04)  
Evangelical   .36* (.17) 
Mainline   .75** (.26) 
Other   .25 (.31) 
Unaffiliated   -.74 (.45) 
Religious Commitment   -.17** (.05) 
   
Tradition-Commitment Interactions   
Evangelical * Commitment   .09  (.11) 
Mainline * Commitment   .04  (.19) 
Other * Commitment   .26 (.19) 
Unaffiliated * Commitment   -.31 (.17) 
   
Religious Tradition Interactions   
Evangelical * Puerto Rican   -.63 (.47) 
Evangelical * Cuban   .95 (.83) 
Evangelical * Other Latino   .69* (.33) 
Mainline * Puerto Rican   -1.21 (1.09) 
Mainline * Cuban   .46 (1.87) 
Mainline * Other Latino   -.25 (.50) 
Other * Puerto Rican   -1.09 (1.15) 
Other * Cuban   2.39 (1.56) 
Other * Other Latino   .07  (.66) 
Unaffiliated * Puerto Rican   -.31 (.82) 
Unaffiliated * Cuban   n.a. 
Unaffiliated * Other   -.19 (.52) 
Evangelical * Raised in U.S.   .37 (.35) 
Evangelical * Raised Abroad   .50 (.40) 
Mainline * Raised in U.S.   1.42* (.58) 
Mainline * Raised Abroad   -.26 (.74) 
Other * Raised in U.S.   .31 (.77) 
Other * Raised Abroad   .01 (.82) 
Unaffiliated * Raised in U.S.   .57 (.57) 
Unaffiliated * Raised Abroad   .04 (.61) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
  
 Partisanship (Republican +) 
Independent Variables (continued) (1) (2) 
Religious Commitment Interactions   
Commitment * Puerto Rican   .09  (.15) 
Commitment * Cuban   -.35 (.27) 
Commitment * Other Latino   -.07 (.10) 
Commitment * Raised in U.S.   .16 (.11) 
Commitment * Raised Abroad   .14  (.12) 
   
Demographic and Political Factors   
Born and Raised Abroad  .05  (.16)  .07 (.16) 
Born and Raised in U.S.  -.10  (.14)  -.15 (.14) 
Puerto Rican  -.20 (.20)  -.21 (.20) 
Cuban  1.57** (.35)  1.44** (.35) 
Other Latino  .20 (.13)  .15 (.13) 
Female  .10  (.12)  .09 (.12) 
Age  -.02** (.00)  -.02** (.00) 
Income Percentile  .01 (.00)  .00 (.00) 
Years of Education  .01  (.03)  -.00 (.03) 
Ideology (Conservative +)  .33** (.06)  .32**  (.06) 
Egalitarianism  -.07  (.09)  -.07  (.09) 
   
Constant  2.25** (.47)  2.44**  (.48) 
   
R2  .12  .18 
Adj. R2  .11  .14 
Root MSE  1.77  1.74 
N  951  951 
   
Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Catholic 
is the reference cateory for religious tradition, Mexican is the reference category for ethnicity, and 
some time abroad as child is the reference category for time spent in the U.S. 
Significance levels: * < .05 ** < .01, 2-tailed tests 
 26
 
Table 4. Religion and Latino Electoral Participation 
       
 Religious Tradition 
Electoral Participation Evangelical Mainline Catholic Other Unaffiliated All 
Registered to Vote 70% 81% 73% 61% 67% 71% 
Reported Voting 47% 65% 52% 50% 41% 50% 
N 198 51 483 38 85 855 
 
